1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
2	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA			
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4	HANA HAQUE,) 3:19-cv-05417-BHS			
5	Plaintiff,) Tacoma, Washington			
6 7	v.) September 13, 2021			
8	NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER) Pretrial CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK,) Conference			
9	Defendants.) 2:30 p.m.			
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11	VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN H. SETTLE			
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE			
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24	Proceedings stenographically reported and transcript produced with computer-aided technology			
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AFTERNOON SESSION 1 2 SEPTEMBER 13, 2021 3 THE CLERK: Hana Haque versus Amtrak, Cause No. 19-05417-BHS. 4 Counsel, please make an appearance. 5 MR. LEVY: Scott Levy on behalf of the plaintiff, 6 Hana Hague. Good afternoon, Your Honor. 7 MS. OREHOSKI: Karen Orehoski on behalf of the plaintiff. MR. YATES: Andrew Yates for Defendant Amtrak, 10 Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. 12 As I think you know when you are observing the newest 13 general order concerning COVID entered by Chief Judge 14 15 Martinez, it indicates that even if vaccinated, masks are required in the courtroom except when speaking. Because I 16 17 interact in some hearings, especially this kind, I have this plexiglass up here and I am vaccinated, I will have my mask 18 off. 19 I want to begin this pretrial conference by going over the 20 motions in limine. I will begin with Plaintiff Hague. 21 22 have had discussion in chambers as to whether it is Haque or 23 Haque. I guess that has been resolved. It is Haque, correct? 2.4 MR. LEVY: My understanding is it is "hawk" like --25

THE COURT: I don't think that was offered as an alternative. I was following the rule from grade school that if the vowel is followed within two letters of another vowel, then it is long. I will have it right, Haque.

The first one is to exclude evidence not produced in discovery. This, of course, is a general rule. The Court will reserve ruling on this, depending on the facts and circumstances during the trial.

The parties are directed to provide, on the eve of each trial day, the witnesses and documents that the proposing party intends to put into evidence. Any objection based upon the fact the evidence was not produced in discovery shall be made and the argument taken before such evidence is offered.

No. 2, to exclude expert testimony not previously disclosed. This is stipulated to and granted. Applies, of course, to both parties.

Exclude reference to collateral sources. It is my understanding that all medical bills submitted to Amtrak have been paid. Amtrak may inform the jury of this fact.

Now, I make that statement. I am not confident that all medical bills have been paid. This crops up as an issue again later on. I would like to understand where we are with respect to that. I have had, of course, a couple of other Amtrak cases in which all medical bills were paid, and the jury was informed as to the extent of medical bills and that

they were paid so those things could be factored in, in arriving at damages.

Where are we? Are there some outstanding medical bills that are controverted?

MR. LEVY: Your Honor, may I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LEVY: The plaintiff -- there is a mistake in the pretrial order. Plaintiff has decided that they are no longer seeking damages for past medical bills.

As to your original question as to whether all of the bills had been paid by Amtrak, I don't think they all have.

In any event, plaintiff is no longer pursuing the past medical damages. As a result, our position is that any reference to Amtrak paying those bills or offering to pay those bills is not relevant to any issue in this case any more and would only be prejudicial. Plaintiff's view would be to ask the Court to preclude any mention of Amtrak offering to pay or paying any medical bills.

THE COURT: Mr. Yates.

MR. YATES: Your Honor, we have been working this out with Mr. Levy. I don't think at this point we intend to offer that we paid past medical specials. The one caveat to that, if I heard Mr. Levy correctly when we were talking before, they may intend to offer some recent past medical bills that have not been presented to Amtrak to try to

establish the reasonable value of future medical care. We do have a number of objections to that. I don't know if the Court would like to hear argument on that now or at a different point.

THE COURT: Let's go ahead and hear that now. I don't want this to crop up during the trial, this issue about paying medical bills. It was my understanding that there would be some mention of medical bills have all been resolved of some kind or another so the jury is not wondering or thinking about and they wouldn't have instructions about medical bills, but when arriving at damages and people are talking about future medical bills and so forth, I think there is a peril that they could confuse all that information and think they have to make some sort of award for special damages as part of the general damages.

I don't see how it is prejudicial to either side. Just makes clarification that past incurred medical bills are not being sought, at least some sort of information to the jury on that basis.

MR. YATES: We think some instruction to the jury along those lines would be appropriate.

MR. LEVY: That is fine with plaintiff, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Then with respect to future medical bills, there is an issue there?

MR. YATES: Yes. So my understanding, Your Honor,

plaintiff has recently resumed care --

THE COURT: By the way, you can remove the mask if you like. It is optional.

MR. YATES: I would prefer to do so. I am fully vaccinated and have been for some time.

THE COURT: You can remove while addressing the Court. It is easier to hear.

MR. YATES: I have been told that the plaintiff intends to offer some billing from a recent mental health counselor as part of their effort to establish the reasonable value of what they think are future medical care.

We have a number of objections to this. The first one is plaintiff has testified herself that she doesn't need any more medical treatment. No future care is within the charts of anybody that she has seen, so it can't be supported for that reason. They don't have a life care planner or an economist that could put a value on those services and then reduce them to present value for services that are going to extend out over time. For simple lack of evidentiary support, they simply shouldn't be allowed in this case.

MR. LEVY: Your Honor, Amtrak is correct. The plaintiff is seeking the reasonable value of future medical care.

The plaintiff is currently in mental health treatment.

She is seeing a therapist on an ongoing, weekly basis.

Our expectation is there will be testimony at trial to support ongoing future medical care related to her mental health. That is why we do seek to admit the bills for Mr. Barone, who is her current mental health treater, and have him discuss the bills and discuss whether it be reasonably necessary for her to get mental health treatment in the future.

THE COURT: So you are going to make a request for medical bills as relates to these? Not just future, but present?

MR. LEVY: No, Your Honor. The plaintiff intends to talk to Mr. Barone and use his billing records as evidence of what the reasonable care -- the reasonable value of care would be in the future.

THE COURT: When did this occur that he produced this? This is a discovery issue well, is it not?

MR. YATES: It is, Your Honor. This was all long after the discovery cut off.

MR. LEVY: I don't know if I want to get sidetracked and discuss the issue on discovery cutoff. Because the plaintiff is still treating, she started seeing this mental health provider in February and is still treating with the provider, right when we got the records about a week and a half ago, we produced those records immediately to Amtrak.

THE COURT: All right. I have permitted before,

Mr. Yates knows this, I permitted before where there has been ongoing continuing treatment to have healthcare providers provide updates. There is enough time here to take a deposition, Mr. Yates, if you need to, of this additional information.

MR. YATES: Yes. Your Honor, it is not so much an issue of ongoing medical care. If she is seeing this treater, she's seeing this treater. It is that we didn't know it was -- that they were going to use past bills to try to establish future bills. It is sort of an evidentiary and discovery issue. There is no foundational support for it because she herself has testified she doesn't need any more treatment and they don't have somebody who can come in and put a value on this.

Mr. Barone is a licensed mental health counselor. He can't come in and give an opinion about the reasonable value of these bills.

THE COURT: He can give an opinion as to his own bills, whether they are reasonable and medically necessary.

MR. YATES: He can't talk about what she might need from somebody else in the future.

THE COURT: That sounds like a problem, all right.

MR. LEVY: From the plaintiff's perspective, the plaintiff is 22 years old. At the time she was deposed, she wasn't in mental health treatment. She's fluctuated, her

symptoms have gone and up down since this train accident. At the current time, she's in mental health treatment, and I think it is appropriate for plaintiff to be allowed to ask the witness -- the treating witness if the plaintiff will need -- if there is a reasonable probability this plaintiff will need future medical care.

THE COURT: From him or someone else?

MR. LEVY: Him.

THE COURT: We are talking about his own medical bills?

MR. YATES: This is the first I am hearing of that. If so, that may be the case. The way it has been represented to us prior is that it is sort of a nebulous, she's going to need future mental health care and I think it is going to cost this much. He can't say what a psychologist or psychiatrist or neuropsychiatrist or speech language pathologist might charge or might do because that is far outside the scope of his expertise.

again, these are not experts that require the report of a treating physician. If they form the opinion at the time of treatment -- if he had an opinion she needs to come back and reasonably can project over the next three or four years or whatever he thinks, and he formulated that, and he can talk about what his hourly rate is, I think that is probably the

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limit of what can be done here.
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             MR. YATES: We still have the issue they don't have
    an economist to discount anything too far out in the future.
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             THE COURT: All right.
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             MR. LEVY: Can I be heard on that issue?
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             THE COURT: Yes.
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             MR. LEVY: We have a proposed jury instruction on
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           I think the Washington panel instructions covered this
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    situation instructing jurors to put everything in present
    value and referring them to a table that has been produced by
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    the State of Washington Office of Insurance from their
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    website.
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             THE COURT: How long are we talking about that you
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    are going to be expecting this witness to indicate she needs
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    additional counseling? How many years?
             MR. LEVY: Well --
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             THE COURT: Months?
             MR. LEVY: We would like to ask Mr. Barone that.
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    am not sure what Mr. Barone will testify to.
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             THE COURT: You don't know at this point even?
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             MR. LEVY: We said in our recent 26(a) disclosure on
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    the damages calculation, we expected the plaintiff to seek
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    therapy every other week for the remainder of her life, which
    would be 60 years. Remains to be seen what Mr. Barone will
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    testify to.
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MR. YATES:
                         This is the problem, Your Honor.
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    kind of thing hasn't been disclosed to us.
             THE COURT: That's pretty significant.
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             MR. LEVY: What hasn't been disclosed?
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             THE COURT: She's looking at lifelong counseling
    every other week. That is a significant bit of new
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    information.
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             MR. LEVY: Oh, no, this was disclosed to defendant a
    long time ago.
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             MR. YATES: It is possible it has been made as a
    claim.
            I haven't seen any evidentiary support for it. As we
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    have agreed, we just got Mr. Barone's records about a week
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13
    ago.
             THE COURT: You have an obligation to -- continuing
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    obligation under Rule 26 to provide this discovery. You
    expected to be able to come in here without ever furnishing
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    them with evidence of lifetime counseling and how much it is
    going to cost?
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             MR. LEVY: We have produced the records we got from
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    Dr. Barone (sic) that indicate she needs ongoing weekly
              We then intend to ask Mr. Barone at trial what sort
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    of future medical mental health needs she needs.
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             MR. YATES: He's not qualified to talk about what
    she's going to need 40, 50, 60 years from now.
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             THE COURT: I don't know that he is either. That is
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a foundation question. Foundation will have to be laid that

he can do that. It may be a matter of cross-examination.

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    This is rather late in the day to be talking about what could
    represent tens of thousands of dollars.
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             MR. LEVY: I understand, Your Honor.
             MR. YATES: They have no economist that can reduce it
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    to present value. Having the jury do that calculation isn't
    appropriate. That's why we have economists.
             THE COURT: You don't have an economist?
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             MR. LEVY: I understand.
             THE COURT: How are you going to get this in,
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    recognizing that these damages must be discounted to present
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    value?
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             MR. LEVY: Of course, Your Honor. Plaintiff's
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    Proposed Exhibit No. 30 -- excuse me, Plaintiff's Exhibit 30
    is the present value table taken from the Office of the
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    Insurance Commissioner for the State of Washington. I
    believe that is a self-authenticating document because it is
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    an official publication of the office. It tells you exactly
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    what to do. If you use the present value table, and you use
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    that in addition to the jury instruction that we proposed, I
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    don't think it is necessary to have an economist in this
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    case.
             THE COURT: You are going to have to show me
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    authority that that is adequate to submit to the jury for
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calculation.
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             MR. LEVY: Okay. I don't have that off the top of my
    head, Your Honor.
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             MR. LANDMAN: Your Honor, I apologize for
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    interrupting. This is Mark Landman, also counsel for Amtrak.
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    We can cut through this, if I can have a moment to make one
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    point.
             THE COURT: I didn't know you were on, Mr. Landman.
    Good afternoon.
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             MR. LANDMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. How have
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    you been?
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             THE COURT: I am fine. Thank you. The procedure
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    succeeded.
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             MR. LANDMAN: Good.
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                                  Good. It is good to hear your
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    voice and everyone getting back in the saddle.
        Your Honor, just cutting right through this, here is I
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    think the critical point: There is nothing in Mr. Barone's
    records that we have been provided that suggest anywhere that
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    Ms. Haque will need 60 years of treatment. In fact, the only
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    thing in his record is the continuation of treatment will
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    either be for six months or one year from the time he first
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    started treating her in February or March of this year. There
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    has been no disclosure whatsoever to support this.
        We don't need to get to the issue of economists,
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    discounted present value. There has been no disclosure by
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any person, medical person or even Mr. Barone, that she will need the 60 years of treatment. That is solely something the plaintiffs put in the disclosure, but we don't have any record from Mr. Barone that says that. They have no expert disclosure in this case. There is just no basis whatsoever that we could have been prepared to respond to that.

THE COURT: Apparently, Ms. Haque herself indicated she's not seeking that, apparently in a deposition?

MR. YATES: That's true.

MR. PETRU: Your Honor, allow me to introduce myself.

My name is Anthony Petru with Mr. Levy for plaintiff on this

matter.

There is a bit of a disconnect here. I think the evidence will bear out that at the time of her deposition, she wasn't in treatment. At that time, I think she was a 21-year-old or 20-year-old who, like many young people who are the subject of a traumatic incident like this, don't know what the course is going to be. It turns out that she, at that time, had just come back from traveling, was not in therapy at that time, but found she needed therapy again.

The testimony will be, and I expect it will be from all the providers, is people who have suffered traumatic incidents like this who have PTSD or a general anxiety disorder associated with a traumatic event will need counseling periodically. It is in the records. In fact,

from the very early records there is an indication she's to come back on a PRN basis.

What we can't do is quantify exactly right now what that frequency is going to be. That's going to have to be what Mr. Barone testifies to.

As the Court indicated, if they want to take his deposition, they can have more detailed information at the time of trial, or I can contact Mr. Barone and find out what he is going to testify to specifically with regard to how frequently in the future.

What is clear is she's going to require access to therapy. She is now three and a half, almost four years post-incident and still suffers the sequela and symptoms associated with her exposures. The probability is that she will continue to have those experiences; when and the frequency she needs therapy is the subject of examination of Mr. Barone.

THE COURT: When was her deposition --

MR. LANDMAN: Your Honor, briefly --

THE COURT: When was her deposition taken?

MR. PETRU: January of 2020.

THE COURT: So we are a year and a half out from that. There was no -- at that time, she said she was not going to be seeking any future medical assistance. Yet, you had an obligation, she had an obligation through you to disclose that that information had changed. They are just

learning it a week and a half ago?

MR. PETRU: No. I'm sorry, Your Honor. We shared with them that had changed some time ago. Both plaintiff and defense have had a very difficult time getting Mr. Barone's records. We got them and shared them with the defense the same day we received them. They knew she was in therapy and knew she had been in therapy for couple of months now. I can't give you the exact date. We didn't sit on it. We shared it as soon as we knew about it, Your Honor.

MR. LANDMAN: If I can respond very briefly.

Mark Landman.

I think Mr. Petru's statement itself tells everything we need to know about why this is prejudicial to the defendant because Mr. Petru said, "We can contact Mr. Barone and ask him how long she will need treatment for in the future."

If it is not in his records and they don't even know it, how can we possibly know it and prepare for trial in two weeks based upon that?

MR. PETRU: If you don't mind my response directly, Your Honor. That's not quite what I said. I said there is a need for access -- there will be a need for access in the future. I don't have the specific number that he gave us. I can find out so that counsel can maybe take his deposition.

We need to try this case on its facts and merits. Defense has the right to know this information and they need to know

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it now, and we will do what we can to get it to them.

THE COURT: The complexion of the case seems to have changed considerably in terms of future medical expenses.

I will allow Amtrak to take Barone's deposition at the expense of plaintiff and reserve ruling on this.

If Amtrak believes it has been prejudiced unfairly with regard to this issue, it can renew or it can make the motion to strike any testimony concerning future medical expenses.

The parties are going to have to do simultaneous briefs on this. We have a short time, obviously. I think in COVID time, this can be set up quickly through Zoom, and then followed with simultaneous briefing on the question of whether, after this deposition was taken, Amtrak finds that it has been unfairly prejudiced from which it cannot adequately prepare for trial.

MR. LEVY: Your Honor, if I may. Where would the prejudice be coming from? Are you talking about from delay?

THE COURT: Prejudice from having -- not having the ability to respond to your information, one. Two, to develop this question of discounted to present value.

MR. LEVY: Understood.

THE COURT: We are excluding expert testimony not previously disclosed. We talked about the collateral source rule already. There is no need to make any reference to collateral sources here.

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No. 4, exclude reference to time or manner of attorney retention. This was agreed to by Amtrak, except it may seek to admit evidence of timing to see certain providers in relation to time of hiring an attorney. This kind of evidence is marginally relevant, but under 403 the propensity to confuse or mislead the jury makes it more unfairly prejudicial than it is probative. That motion is granted.

No. 5 is to exclude reference to location of attorney's law firm. That's agreed to and granted.

No. 6 is exclude reference to tax on discovery. I have not only allowed this information to be communicated to a jury, but also given an instruction on it. I received once a juror question about taxability and I answered it consistent with the law. That is, that the award will not be taxed. That is the law as I understand it presently. Otherwise, a jury could gross up its calculation to include some speculated amount that will have to be paid and thereby reduce plaintiff's compensation. That is denied without prejudice.

If plaintiff can come and show me in some ways, under some law, state or federal law, that this would be taxable, then you can renew the motion. Everything that I have been instructed on with regard to taxability is this is not taxable.

I think the juror question that I got once is

demonstrative of the fact that these are matters that are confusing to a jury. I don't think they should be speculating about whether their award should take into consideration taxability.

Exclude reference to the absence of parties or witnesses. The Court follows the general rule that it is improper to comment on the absence of a witness to allow an inference that such witnesses' testimony would be adverse to the other party where such witness is available to either party to testify.

While it can have some arguable relevance in some cases, the unfair prejudice to the other party is outweighed by any probative value. Plaintiff has the burden of proving her injuries and medical prognosis and treatment. Failure to call all treatment providers is actually encouraged by the Court where such testimony is cumulative or mostly cumulative. The motion there is granted.

No. 8 is exclude evidence of preexisting conditions. The Court reserves ruling on this motion. It is correct that a witness may not speculate. It is permissible, if in good faith the defense has evidence that some part of her physical, mental or emotional condition today can be tied in part to other events or causes. The Court will reserve ruling on that one.

No. 9 is exclude evidence of defendant's good character or

other good acts. That issue was tied up in really the question of paying the medical bills. We have already discussed that. The jury should be informed that the medical bills are not an issue in this case and have been paid. Doesn't need to indicate who paid, only that it is not a concern for them.

Amtrak's motions begin with, No. 1, exclude evidence of Amtrak's liability. In previous Dupont derailment cases, the Court has excluded evidence regarding liability. However, it has also allowed some evidence relevant to emotional and psychological damages that pertain to the speed and force of the derailment as well as a limited number of photos to demonstrate the magnitude of the aftermath of the derailment.

Here, plaintiff is expected to testify as to what she observed when she regained consciousness. That has relevance to her claims for emotional and psychological damages.

I am concerned about admitting testimony of an Amtrak employee who will expected to be called to testify.

What is relevant here is what plaintiff experienced, not what someone else who had perhaps a similar experience.

I will reserve ruling on calling a separate witness, and the admissibility will depend upon the extent to which Amtrak may attempt to attack plaintiff's recall of what she experienced and observed.

This other employee of Amtrak, to me, it is just

somebody -- it could be anybody else, but I don't see the

2 need for having another witness come and describe the scene. MR. LEVY: May I be heard, Your Honor? 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MR. LEVY: The plaintiff, as Mr. Petru described, was 5 18 at the time. She was knocked unconscious in the passenger 6 When she came to, she noted she was outside on the 7 ground near a hill. As she made her way to the hill, she was hysterical. She was not, you know -- it was a highly stressful situation for her. 10 The relevance of Chris Burniger, who was an Amtrak 11 employee, Mr. Burniger was located -- he was sitting on the 12 train in a passenger car behind plaintiff. At the time of 13 14 the derailment, he jumped into action and started walking 15 around and helping passengers, surveying the scene and doing what he could to help folks. 16 17 I think what Burniger will add here is a perspective of somebody who wasn't quite as injured. I don't believe 18 Mr. Burniger was knocked unconscious. He also brings the 19 perspective, being an Amtrak employee, he understands the 20 speed of force, how fast the train was going. He understands 21 22 some details the plaintiff may not be aware of. THE COURT: Mr. Yates. 23 MR. YATES: I believe Mr. Burniger had a shoulder 24 repair surgery. He was represented by Mr. Petru's firm. 25

There hasn't been any evidence or disclosure or connection between Mr. Burniger and Ms. Haque whatsoever.

I think Your Honor correctly identified the problem with this in your tentative ruling, and I would ask that you make that ruling.

THE COURT: She had a friend that was riding with her. She's expected to be a witness.

MR. LEVY: She's not going to be a witness.

Emily Torgeson is her friend. She was sitting next to Emily at the time of the incident. Emily is currently in Cairo, Egypt, and she's not going to be testifying in this case.

The plaintiff did have a falling out after the trauma, as a lot of trauma survivors who witness the same trauma sometimes happens, they had a falling out and are no longer on speaking terms.

As far as the fact witnesses, the lay witnesses who would be able to testify to the scene, we have three on our list, I believe. We have Kyle Steel, who is another passenger who was on the train who first met Plaintiff Hana at the top of the hill and rode the ambulance together with her. They maintained a relationship over text message for some time after the derailment. The other witness is Mr. Burniger, who we have discussed, and then Hana would be the third.

THE COURT: I am going to exclude -- how did you pronounce the name?

MR. LEVY: Burniger. 1 THE COURT: Burniger. I am going to exclude him. 2 3 think under a 403 analysis, the unfair prejudice of producing an Amtrak employee who was not in the same car, apparently 4 didn't observe her, his only purpose then would be to testify 5 as to what he observed. 6 7 What is relevant to her psychological injury and damage is what she remembers, what she recalls, and the other witness, who was riding there with her, can certainly -- or was on the hill with her can assist in describing the scene and how she 10 found her and those sorts of things. That is sufficient. 11 More than that, I believe, is a 403 problem. 12 MR. LEVY: Okav. 13 MR. YATES: Your Honor, may I --14 15 THE COURT: Yes. MR. YATES: Now that it has been confirmed that 16 17 plaintiff is not calling Ms. Torgeson, I have let Mr. Levy know this, but we may be submitting testimony from her 18 deposition by designation in our case. 19 THE COURT: All right. If she's unavailable to 20 testify and you can meet the standard. 21 22 MR. YATES: She is in Cairo, Egypt. THE COURT: The last part of that motion was to 23 exclude reference to Positive Train Control. That has been 24 25 agreed to and granted.

Second is exclude media reports or return to service. The Court will reserve ruling on this. As a general matter, news media accounts, photos and videos are not relevant. However, a foundation may be laid that plaintiff viewing media reports exacerbated her emotional and psychological damages. This does not necessarily mean plaintiff's counsel can introduce specific news media videos or reports unless the plaintiff can specifically identify such report as having been seen or read by her and what specific reaction it caused her to have. The Court will have to be presented with such evidence outside the presence of the jury. You can bring that to the Court's attention in advance, and I will take up any objection to the specific media account reference.

- No. 3 is exclude reference to congressional intent. That is agreed to and granted.
- No. 4, exclude reference to motions in limine. That's agreed to and therefore granted.
- No. 5 is exclude evidence not produced in discovery. I am giving the same ruling it did in plaintiff's motion. It is granted.
- No. 6 is exclude reference to discovery orders or issues.

 That's agreed to and granted.
- No. 7, exclude reference to Amtrak derailments, crossing collision and other incidents. This was opposed by plaintiff asserting that something might be offered in this area that

Case 3:19-cv-05417-BHS Document 49 Filed 09/16/21 Page 26 of 50 affected the plaintiff. I am skeptical, I must say, and 1 2 plaintiff will have to indicate, in advance of offering any such evidence, to Amtrak of what it intends to present. 3 There is still a strong chance the Court would exclude it 4 under 403. 5 Can you tell me now, is there some evidence of some other 6 collision, derailment or accident that is relevant directly 7 to her emotional damage? MR. LEVY: Yes, two different instances, the first one is the plaintiff had a conversation -- had a relationship 10 with somebody named Tiffany Nixon, who was involved in a 11 train accident in South Carolina. They maintained a 12 relationship and discussed their traumas together, their 13 trauma from the train. 14 15 The second incident involving a derailment, I believe it

occurred someplace in Asia. This comes up in Mr. Barone's mental health care records of plaintiff. The focus of therapy that particular day was Hana, the plaintiff, telling Mr. Barone she had seen a news story about this crash in Asia and it retraumatized her and there was a discussion about that.

THE COURT: That didn't involve Amtrak.

MR. LEVY: No, it does not.

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THE COURT: I think that will be clear in the testimony. That is the kind of testimony I am saying I may allow.

MR. LEVY: The South Carolina train accident, I believe, was an Amtrak derailment. The person, Tiffany Nixon, who was put in contact with plaintiff is somebody that Amtrak provided that information to Hana. I do think Hana should be able to testify what impact talking to Tiffany, the South Carolina survivor, had on her.

MR. YATES: Your Honor, may I be heard on this?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. YATES: The context here is when we finally got the Barone records after months and months, we reviewed them and there was references to emails and text exchanges with other train survivors. We asked in the first set of discovery in this case for exactly such things, any communications, things like that with other people that they have talked to about this stuff. We heard nothing until less than a week ago about this, when we specifically asked for it and said, hey, looks like there may be something you haven't provided. They said, we'll look into it and we will get it to you.

They have gotten us this, but I have questions about whether there are other things, including texts with Ms. Steel. It is problematic that this is now being advanced as a claim after we uncovered these communications after the discovery cutoff.

THE COURT: It doesn't sound like to me it is a new claim. It is all part of the claim and they are representing this as being part of the psychological harm she suffered, that when she has conversation with somebody, like someone else who had a similar experience, it brought all the nightmares back. That kind of testimony.

MR. YATES: It is a new witness with Ms. Smith -- or the witness they just -- it is a new witness that has never been on their list and identified, and also hearsay and other admissibility problems for those emails.

THE COURT: Are you calling her as a witness or having plaintiff talk about this? Actually, it is going to come through Barone?

MR. LEVY: The South Carolina accident would come through Hana, the plaintiff. She would discuss that, her experience talking to the South Carolina survivor. The second issue would be Hana should be entitled to talk about her retraumatization after she heard the news story about a crash in Asia.

THE COURT: I am going to allow that. With respect to the South Carolina derailment, it is not hearsay. What you are talking about there is not being offered for the truth of the matter that this other person had this experience. Rather, it was plaintiff's response to this information, whether true or not.

She can testify concerning that conversation. Again, I don't think it is excluded under 403. I don't think it is unfairly prejudicial. Probably consistent with other triggers that she's talked about.

I am going to exclude -- No. 3, exclude reference to congressional intent. That's agreed to and granted. I think I covered that.

I think I am down to No. 7, exclude reference to Amtrak derailments. I covered that.

No. 8, exclude comparative wealth. That is agreed to and granted.

No. 9 is exclude reference to liability insurance, which is agreed to and granted.

No. 10 is exclude reference to NTSB report. Plaintiff opposes, but does not address relevance. In what way would the NTSB report be relevant in this case?

MR. LEVY: Your Honor, our view of defendant's motion on the NTSB reports is it is overly broad. My read of the cases is that the NTSB reports, the conclusions are kept out but the factual part is allowed in, in the *Chevron* case, as well as the *Riggs* case.

Amtrak didn't tell us which exhibits they sought to keep out in this. I have gone through and noted the various exhibits here that are NTSB-produced documents. I can go through those with you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, what are they?

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MR. LEVY: Exhibit 9, for example, is the illustrated accident diagram, which is an overhead picture of the train accident identifying the various car numbers.

We think that is particularly relevant because the plaintiff has testified that she was in a car that landed on the dirt and was on its side.

THE COURT: I have indicated I am going to permit some photos or maps, if it is from the NTSB. You are going to have to work out with Amtrak which ones you want. I am saying, I am going to limit those because liability is not an issue. Some photos are going to be relevant to depict the magnitude of this accident as relevant to the emotional and psychological harm that was suffered. So I expect you to work this out with Amtrak, and if there is still a dispute, I will resolve it.

MR. LEVY: I appreciate that, Your Honor. There are some documents that are not photographs that I believe are facts that would be relevant and probative in this case as well. One of them is our Exhibit 21, which is a table. It is Train 501 characteristics. What this document is, is it identifies each of the railcars that made up the train that day, sequences them 1 through 14. It has the bistro car and the dining car as cars 5 and 6. The first passenger car behind those is Amtrak Car 7504. That's our understanding

from Hana's testimony, from Hana's interview at the hospital, she was located in the car immediately behind the dining and bistro cars.

We think it is relevant to have -- we think it is important for the jury to be able to see the table to be able to identify what car she was in.

The reason this is so important here is because Car 7504 was the most seriously damaged car in that entire train. All three fatalities came out of that car. More than 60 percent of the roof compressed. The survivability in that car was very low. Most passengers were significantly injured there.

We think this document here that shows which car, identifies the cars by car number and sequence, is very probative and helpful in this case.

THE COURT: Again, I am going to let you work with Amtrak. That sounds like to me the type of evidence, on a limited basis, I am going to permit so the story can be told as to where she was when the derailment occurred, where she ended up and the damage to her car is relevant.

MR. LEVY: Thank you, Your Honor.

Before we move on, I want to see if are there any other NTSB-related documents that we haven't covered here, if you don't mind.

The only other NTSB document, Your Honor, is Exhibit 24, which is an interview taken of the plaintiff at the hospital,

Good Samaritan Hospital by the police department.

Our position on that is it is admissible. We think -- it was taken less than three hours after the accident. We think it is admissible as an excited utterance. We think she was still under the impact of that startling event at the time she gave that statement. She was still in the hospital. The nexus between her statement and -- the nexus between her statement and -- the nexus between her statement and the event are very clear. She was talking exactly about the event and it was clearly a startling event.

THE COURT: Mr. Yates.

MR. YATES: She'll be here to testify. I don't think that it is admissible on that basis. It would also need to be reviewed for compliance with the Court's rulings on other motions in limine.

As a general matter, I will say, certainly as we have done in the other cases, we will work with the plaintiff and try our best to come to an agreed set of exhibits that go to damages.

One of our concerns is, of course, the difference between liability evidence, which is inappropriate for the jury, and argument and questioning is included in that, and evidence that sets the scene, which we obviously understand the Court has ruled is admissible. We will work with Mr. Levy and his team on this issue.

THE COURT: All right. I expect you to look at that

document as well. This is a pretty limited request. 1 2 sounds like it would qualify as excited utterance, so work with him on it. 3 MR. YATES: We will, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Exclude punitive damages, that's agreed 5 to and granted. 6 7 No. 12, exclude reference to other settlement offers, that's agreed to and granted. Exclude the inflammatory questions, statements and arguments of necessity. This motion is denied. The Court 10 will rule on any objection made relating to these concerns 11 when and if they arise. 12 No. 14 is exclude reference to fatalities. Plaintiff is 13 expected to testify to seeing a deceased man. This is 14 15 relevant to her pain and suffering claim. The Court will defer ruling until testimony is being offered, but will 16 17 likely rule that it is relevant, not precluded by 403. Other references to fatalities should come in an offer of 18 proof outside the presence of the jury. 19 MR. PETRU: Your Honor, this is Anthony Petru, if I 20 may interrupt. With regard to Defense No. 12, that was 21 evidence of other settlements and offers to settle 22 plaintiff's case, there is a concomative issue there where 23

they was some discussion with the therapist about wanting to

have the case settled. I think there is a lot of prejudice

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that might be evoked in that if it is used incorrectly. Of course, she would like to have the matter behind her. I would ask the Court to be aware of that. There may be some objections with regard to soliciting references in the medical records where she is talking to the therapist about talking to us as her attorneys to try to get the case settled.

I am not quite sure whether the Court subsumed any references to any settlement discussion, whether it is with the parties directly or with the therapist. I would like to have the Court comment on that, if you can.

THE COURT: Were you going to add something?

MR. LEVY: I spoke to Andy about this earlier. The plaintiff did intend to file a supplementary motion in limine and tell Your Honor that, speaking exactly to what Mr. Petru says, the plaintiff has expressed some feelings about the settlement, her desire to settle, the amount of money she would accept, fear of going to trial. Things like that, we think are not probative of any of the issues in the case and could be considerably prejudicial. We ask that the Court keep that out. We are happy to do a formal motion in limine on that, if you like.

THE COURT: Mr. Yates, do you have any different view of this?

MR. YATES: There is no motion on this before the

Court. I would say the Court should take this as it comes up in trial. Certainly, I think not everything that is being referenced in the record here would be admissible. I think there are other things that would be and should be, depending on how the evidence comes in. I think we should leave it until then.

THE COURT: Of course, motions in limine are helpful to the Court to alert the Court to evidentiary issues that will expect it to arise. We now expect this could arise. I want you to work it out and talk with him. From the description that has been given, sounds like the sort of thing that would be unfairly prejudicial to Amtrak as much as to plaintiff about the desire to settle.

MR. YATES: Thank you, Your Honor. We will work on this issue.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PETRU: Thank you, Your Honor. Appreciate the indulgence.

THE COURT: Moving on to 15, exclude cumulative fact witnesses. The Court is concerned about too many fact witnesses testifying concerning an observation of how plaintiff's injuries and experience in the derailment affected her emotionally, psychologically and otherwise. Generally, a couple of family members and close friends is sufficient unless it appears that such witnesses' testimony

is being attacked by Amtrak. There would then be deemed a need to corroborate with additional witnesses. Plaintiff intends to call Kyle Steel. We have already talked about this case. Of course, she may testify.

Amtrak correctly referenced rule -- Local Rule 43(j) that without Court approval, there should only be one expert on a particular subject. Amtrak indicates it is unclear in what ways the treating mental health provider will speak on separate subjects and to what extent they might be cumulative.

Response by plaintiff is not completely clear to me, so I would ask counsel if you could explain to me who your treatment providers are, psychological, the mental health providers, and how they -- each are different and needed.

MR. LEVY: Of course, Your Honor.

MR. PETRU: Scott, do you want me to do it?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ LEVY: I think I can do it. Sorry it wasn't more clear in the papers.

The first mental health treater the plaintiff saw was Willow Meyers. The plaintiff saw Willow Meyers right after the incident in 2018, January of 2018. She diagnosed the plaintiff with PTSD after a long assessment. Willow Meyers is the person we talked about earlier. She's going to be put on by deposition transcript.

The next mental health care provider is somebody named

Phil Burns. The plaintiff saw Phil Burns in 2019 for about ten visits. He continued to notice the impact of the trauma on the plaintiff. What is important about his testimony is that it comes a year and a half after the incident. It shows the plaintiff is still suffering from these symptoms.

The last mental health care provider the plaintiff intends to call is Mr. Mark Barone. Mark Barone is the current treating provider for plaintiff. Mr. Barone has diagnosed Hana Haque with a general anxiety disorder. He believes many of her symptoms are directly related to the train accident. Plaintiff began seeing Mr. Barone in 2021.

There is no overlap as far as the time frame. The first treater diagnosed her with PTSD. There was a treater in the middle who treated her in college. Now she is seeing Mr. Barone, who diagnosed her with a general anxiety disorder.

THE COURT: That's a sufficient explanation for the Court because they are sequential health care providers, not technical experts, which the rule is really addressed to. I don't have a concern about those three.

MR. LEVY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The last was to exclude all unpaid medical expenses. We have already talked about that subject. That completes the Court's ruling on motions in limine.

Jury selection, there will be eight jurors selected. I

have had some suggestion internally here about whether jury selection should be done through Zoom or in person. As of right now, I believe in-person jury selection is certainly workable and doable. We will have the prospective number of jurors, around 24 -- Gretchen, is that about right?

THE CLERK: 26.

THE COURT: We can have them distanced, socially distanced, and they'll be wearing masks, again, until they are spoken to and then they can remove the mask when responding.

Let me just ask the parties to comment on the Court's plan to do the jury selection in person.

MR. LEVY: Plaintiff agrees with Your Honor's plan.

MR. YATES: As does defendant.

THE COURT: All right. I might add my colleagues have done jury selection through Zoom and they speak of it highly saying you can actually see straight on a juror and in some respects they think it is preferable. I am just enough old school to believe that it is going to operate better, we have a better jury selection process and voir dire if they are here in court and not at home sitting in their bedroom responding.

The jury selection process will begin with, I put a chart in the front of the courtroom here that asks the jurors to introduce themselves to each other and to us, asks them about

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where they live, occupation, family, hobbies and interests.

After they do that, then I will conduct voir dire. I will go through the questions you have been provided, the questions that I will be asking, and when I have completed my questions, I am going to give 20 minutes to each side to conduct voir dire.

I looked at the proposed voir dire questions. With respect to the plaintiff's, there are two that I don't want the plaintiff to pursue. One is No. 5, does anyone have any concerns that plaintiff only has to prove her damages by a preponderance of evidence? They won't yet have been given the instruction on what a preponderance of evidence is. I can see this leading into questions coming back. I don't think it is a significant area of concern.

The other one is No. 15, do you feel emotional or psychological injuries are as important as physical injuries? I don't know how I would answer that question. In one manner, the emotional, psychological injuries are just as important. In some cases, they are more important. I just -- I don't want the inference drawn in any way one way or the other there. I know what you are trying to drive at.

MR. PETRU: Your Honor, this is Anthony Petru. I understand the Court's concern. However, part of our task here is to weed out those potential jurors who don't believe that emotional injuries or emotional distress are worthy of

the same compensation as physical pain. Some people just don't believe it. How are we going to find that out if we can't ask the question? I would certainly prefer the Court ask those questions.

THE COURT: I think the way you phrased it was better than the way it is in the question here.

MR. PETRU: I am happy to do that. I am happy to do that during my precious 20 minutes. I find sometimes, I don't know, this is a case of emotional distress. There is a physical injury that is relatively minor in the big picture, elbow injury, hit in the head and a cut. The biggest part here is the emotional trauma she suffered and the PTSD and anxiety she carries forward. I want to make sure the jurors understand, as the law understands, that those are equally compensable to physical pain based on the evidence.

THE COURT: All right. I think you can phrase it in a way I am going to be satisfied with. I don't want them to be left that they are the same, because they can be different.

MR. PETRU: They are different.

THE COURT: Yeah. All right. With respect to

Amtrak's No. 27, how would you generally characterize the

frequency with which you have used the health care industry,

including doctors, hospitals and other providers? I think

that is too invasive or potentially offensive. I don't think

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it is very probative, frankly. That one, I would ask you not
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    to ask of the jurors.
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             MR. PETRU: What number is that?
             THE COURT:
                         No. 27.
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             MR. PETRU:
                         Thank you.
             THE COURT: So then after you have completed your
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    voir dire process, then we will take up the excusal for
    cause, challenge for cause. I am pretty generous on excusing
    for cause where there are hardships. We try to screen for
    hardships before they come into the courtroom for the
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    selection process. I inevitably find somebody has a parent
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    at home they are taking care of, some young child, they have
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    a trip planned of some kind. I will encourage excusing them
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    for cause.
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        After taking up those, we will do the peremptory
    challenges, that will be three for each side. We will have
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    eight jurors. You may end up striking the same jurors because
    I am going to ask you to make your strikes, once you complete
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    the process, share with opposing counsel. As I said, you may
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    end up finding you have stricken one or more common jurors.
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    Then I will ask you -- I'll have the jury composition in
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    front of me and I'll ask if this is the jury you have
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    selected.
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        Any questions about jury selection?
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             MR. PETRU:
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have the jury whittled down for any rulings the Court makes on cause, they would be to the first -- I guess it would be the first 14 jurors, first eight would be who survived out of the 14. THE COURT: That is correct. MR. PETRU: Okay. Sometimes I just want to say it to make sure. THE COURT: I have also had distributed to you the preliminary jury instructions, which are standard model instructions from the circuit. No. 2 is the Court employed the parties' statement of the case there. Any comments about preliminary jury instructions? MR. LEVY: No, Your Honor. MR. YATES: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: I have also talked about the importance

of, on the eve of each trial day, for the party who is currently presenting to give to the other side a list of witnesses and documents that they expect the witnesses to testify to.

The trial day begins at 9:00 and ends at 4:30 with a noon recess between 12:00 and 1:30. 15-minute recess in the mid-morning and mid-afternoon. Mid-morning is usually around 10:30. The afternoon, typically around three. I will move that sometimes a little bit in order to complete a witness or for other reasons.

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If there is an objection that I think needs to be taken up
outside the presence of the jury, I may do that when the
objection is raised or I may defer until the next recess, if
it can be handled better that way. I don't do sidebars.
                                                          Ιf
we are going to take up an objection outside the presence of
the jury, they will be excused. We will not be using the
jury room to ex -- when they are excused, we are going to use
the adjacent courtroom where there is more space available,
healthier situation there.
   I think that covers what I wanted to talk about. Any
questions or concerns?
        MR. LEVY: No concerns --
        MR. PETRU: Your Honor --
        THE COURT: Yes.
        MR. PETRU: Sorry, Scott. Your Honor, based on your
experience, would we expect we would have the jury selected,
opening statements and have one or two witnesses ready the
first day? That is always a hard thing for plaintiff to
gauge, particularly when you have people that are
professionals.
        THE COURT:
                    Typically I -- in this case, I think I
may end up, let's see, this begins on the 28th?
        MR. PETRU:
                    Right.
        THE COURT: I think we are going to probably have to
start at 1:30, so we will only have jury selection.
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reason that is it appears to me, though it has not been confirmed, I expect it to be confirmed, I am sitting on a three-judge panel for the circuit in which I will be participating by Zoom. That is in the morning hours. We will hear oral argument and there will be conferencing. I meant to mention this possibility, not only possibility, it appears to be a probability as of right now, I would say plan on beginning not at 1:30 but at 1:00 for jury selection.

MR. PETRU: We will have witnesses on Tuesday.

THE COURT: I think it would be unlikely we will get opening statements, but that would be good. But I don't think we will get to witnesses.

MR. PETRU: Thank you for the heads up. We have some scrambling to do.

THE COURT: Thank you for reminding me. I meant to mention that at the outset.

MR. LEVY: I have a couple additional things I would like to raise. The first one is Dr. Hansen, who is over in Bellingham at WWU health center. He treated the plaintiff after the accident, diagnosed her with a concussion. He's made the request he testify by video. I have raised this with Amtrak. I am not sure of their position on it yet. I did want to raise it with the Court. Dr. Hansen has told me he is concerned about COVID. That is primarily the reason he prefers to testify by video.

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THE COURT: I expect the parties to work out
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    testimony by video. I think it works reasonably well, not
    withstanding my other statements about jury selection. We
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    have a large screen here. Each of the jurors have their own
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    individual screens they can view. I would encourage Amtrak
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    to agree.
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             MR. YATES: We are in agreement with respect to that,
    Your Honor. We may have a discussion, I'll have it
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    separately with Mr. Levy about our cumulative motion on
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    treaters.
             THE COURT: Okay.
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             MR. YATES: I will talk to him about that.
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             THE COURT: You had a couple matters.
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             MR. LEVY: Yes. Your Honor, I also have some
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    additional motions in limine that did not make their way into
    the writing I can address with you now or --
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             THE COURT: Why didn't they?
             MR. LEVY: Some of them just came about after.
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    of them we didn't think about until after we talked to the
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    witness.
             THE COURT: Let's hear them. As I said, it is better
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    to know these things in advance of trial. If Amtrak needs
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    some time to respond in writing, we can do that.
             MR. LEVY: Appreciate it, Your Honor. The first one
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    is Jocelyn Doherty, who is a lay witness. Jocelyn lived with
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Hana before and after the accident. She has an employment history that includes working at a gentlemen's club as a dancer and a web cam model. I think it is just not relevant, her employment history here, and potentially pretty prejudicial.

THE COURT: She's going to testify concerning what?

MR. LEVY: She's going to testify to the changes she has seen in Hana. She's essentially an adopted sister of Hana's. She's seen significant changes in Hana's personality

THE COURT: You heard what I was saying about lay witnesses. There is going to be some limitation on those. I don't want to see a redundancy, unless Amtrak is challenging in substance the -- what is being testified to regarding their observations of the plaintiff.

MR. LEVY: Understood.

and behavior since the accident.

MR. PETRU: This is Anthony Petru. We are very aware of the issue with potential redundancy. In terms of friends and acquaintances, Jocelyn is the only friend or acquaintance who is a before-and-after witness outside of Hana's parents. That is essentially it for lay witnesses. Kyle, who was the woman who saw her on the hill, will testify with regard to her observation, but she certainly isn't a before and after, just an after.

THE COURT: That sounds fine. Mr. Yates, do you want

to respond to this? Sounds like to me that would be not relevant, and even if marginally relevant, only to embarrass the witness.

MR. YATES: Right. Your Honor, I am inclined to agree. We would have liked to have been able to evaluate the motion to respond in writing. I don't think it is going to present an issue. I will confirm that with the rest of our team. I don't anticipate that being an issue at trial.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LEVY: The last one is there is several references in the medical records to plaintiff using cannibis; we would like to keep that out as well. There is also a reference in the academic transcripts that defendant has on their exhibit list, an incident in college where an RA came by and the plaintiff was smoking or somebody in the plaintiff's room was smoking a joint. There was some discipline for that. That episode, I think, has no bearing here and any reference to her drug use, which is totally normal for a kid her age, we think that should all be excluded.


THE COURT: You have said two different things, marijuana and drug use.

MR. LEVY: By drug use, I meant marijuana.

THE COURT: Mr. Yates.

MR. YATES: I actually believe there was some

Adderall or Ritalin use. I will have to check the records on 1 2 that. 3 What I would say, Your Honor, what I -- I think our position is going to have to depend on the plaintiff's 4 5 testimony a little bit. What I anticipate is there will be testimony that after this incident, there was some problems 6 with school and a disruption in that. 7 If that's the case, we may want to explore other reasons why there was disruption in her academic engagement. Again, I will talk to our team about that and Mr. Levy and 10 try to work something out. This one is more nuanced based on 11 what I expect the plaintiff's testimony to be. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 Any opportunity to settle this? I assume you have had 14 15 settlement discussions. MR. YATES: We have. We, in fact, are having another 16 17 mediation on Saturday. THE COURT: All right. Well, it will allow the Court 18 to take, then, the next trial that I have, which right now I 19 20 am having to tell them that this case is going to probably 21 bump them. As soon as you have word, you will, of course, let us know. 22 MR. YATES: We will, Your Honor. 23 MR. PETRU: 24 Of course. 25 THE COURT: Thank you. We'll be in recess.



1	CERTIFICATE
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4	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from
5	the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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9	/s/ Angela Nicolavo
10	ANGELA NICOLAVO COURT REPORTER
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Į	Angela Nicolavo - Court Reporter - 1717 Pacific Avenue - Tacoma WA 98402 - 253-882-3832